The decline of average stock return volatility in the 2001-2006 period provides an opportunity to test various theories on why the average return volatility increased in the pre-2000 period. This paper compares fundamentals-based theories with trading volume-based theories. While both fundamentals-based and trading volume-based theories explain the upward trend in the average volatility in U.S. stocks from 1976 to 2000 and international stocks from 1990 to 2000, only the fundamentals-based theories explain the volatility pattern for [2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006]. Much of the variation in the stock return volatilities can be explained by the variation in the earnings volatilities and proxies for growth options, but not by tradingrelated variables. Evidence also shows that the explanatory power of the fundamentals variables is time varying.
I. Introduction
Stock return volatility is at the center of asset pricing research. At the portfolio level, volatility is the simplest measure of investment risk. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) find that the average return volatility in the U.S. stock market increased during the period from 1962 to 1997. More importantly, it is the average idiosyncratic volatility that has been increasing, whereas the volatility of the value-weighted market portfolio does not follow an overall increasing pattern. This finding has prompted many studies on why the average return volatilities of individual stocks have increased. There are several possible causes, according to these studies, including increased stock ownership by financial institutions, deteriorating earnings, increasing earnings volatilities, increased earnings growth options, changing profiles of the stocks listed in the exchanges, increased derivative trading, etc. A consensus, however, has not been reached on identifying the main source of the observed increased stock return volatilities.
In this paper, time-varying stock return volatilities are reexamined. What motivates this study is a recent change in the volatility pattern since the publication of the paper by Campbell et al. (2001) . During the 2001-2006 period, both the total volatilities and the idiosyncratic volatilities of individual stocks fell dramatically, reversing the increasing pattern that had lasted for about 40 years. In the second half of 2007, stock return volatilities started to climb again and reached their all-time high in October 2008. There is no doubt that stock return volatilities will fluctuate in the future. These fluctuations offer an opportunity to evaluate the various theories on the causes of time-varying volatilities. A good theory should predict the rise of the volatilities before 2000, the fall during the 2001-2006 period, and the rise again in 2008. There is evidence that the volatility patterns differ across various economic sectors and industries. There is also evidence that a similar rise and fall pattern exists in average idiosyncratic volatilities across various international markets. A good theory should also be valid for the various sectors/industries in the U.S. and in markets of other countries.
I compare two sets of theories on what causes stock return volatilities to change. The first set of theories is based on fundamentals variables. Since a stock's price is the present value of all its future dividends paid from earnings, it is natural to model return volatility as an increasing function of the uncertainty about current and future earnings. According to this theory, stock returns become more volatile simply because the fundamentals of the company, such as its earnings and sales, worsen, or the volatilities of the earnings and sales increase. The second set of theories has diverse sources, but they are all linked to return volatilities through trading volume. In the second half of the twentieth century, when the average stock return volatility increased, both institutional trading and derivative trading dramatically increased. Also, during this period transaction costs fell substantially and information about firm performance became more readily available, which induced more trading. It is natural to conjecture that increased stock return volatilities have something to do with institutional trading, derivative trading, and information-induced trading.
I examine the roles that fundamentals variables and trading volume-related variables play in explaining time-varying return volatilities. The results for the entire U.S. market show that both fundamentals variables and trading volume variables explain the upward trend in average volatilities up to 2000. However, trading volume variables lose their explanatory power for the period from 2001 to 2006, while the explanatory power of the fundamentals variables remains strong. To a lesser extent, this is also confirmed by the averages of various sectors in the U.S. and the averages of international markets. The evidence from the U.S. market also shows that the explanatory power of the fundamentals variables is time varying. Of the two fundamentals variables, the uncertainty about future earnings growth appears to have better explanatory power than the uncertainty about the current earnings in explaining the idiosyncratic volatilities of the valueweighted averages of the U.S. market, especially when the market value peaked around 2000. However, the uncertainty about current earnings has a more robust relationship with the return volatilities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the literature that is directly relevant to volatility trends. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the time-series regression results. The last section concludes the paper.
II. A Brief Review of the Literature
The literature on stock return volatility is voluminous. The following is a very brief account of the various theories about why the average volatility has increased over time. Some theories are obvious and agreed upon among researchers, while others are more controversial. The theories that are based on traditional asset pricing principles are called fundamentals-based theories, while the theories that are related to the literature on microstructure and financial systems are called trading volume-based theories because the effects on stock return volatilities are all from the trading volume.
Theoretically, a stock's price is the present value of its expected future dividends. It is not difficult to deduce that the volatility of stock returns is positively related to the conditional variance of future dividends under mild technical conditions. Vuolteenaho (2002) presents a model of this positive relationship. In empirical work, earnings data are often chosen to replace dividends because dividends are generated at the managers' discretion, which means that realized dividends can be poor indicators of potential future dividends. Pástor and Veronesi (2003) use the sample variance of firm-level earnings to explain cross-sectional differences in return volatilities, but not the time variation in return volatilities, because the earnings variances they construct are calculated with earnings across the entire sample period and have no time variation. Wei and Zhang (2006) construct earnings variances using firm-level earnings in the past 12 quarters and examine their relation to return volatilities both cross sectionally and in time series. In both Pástor and Veronesi (2003) and Wei and Zhang (2006) , realized earnings are used in addition to earnings variances because realized earnings also predict future earnings volatilities: A low or negative realized earnings number is typically followed by greater uncertainty about future earnings than is a large, positive realized earnings number. Wei and Zhang (2006) show that, cross sectionally, return volatilities of individual stocks are negatively related to past earnings and positively related to the sample variance of earnings. In a time-series analysis, the average earnings and earnings variance explain the trends in the average return volatility. Irvine and Pontiff (2009) extend the work to consider the volatility of cash flows and sales, allegedly due to increased market competition, and they obtain similar results.
An obvious reason for the average stock return volatility to change over time is the changing profile of the listed stocks, from which the average return volatility is taken. That newly listed stocks have characteristics prone to higher volatility is also observed by Fama and French (2004) and Schwert (2002) . Wei and Zhang (2006) document that the number of firms included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database substantially increased up to 1998, especially in the 1980s with the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks. About one-third of the increasing trend in the average volatility can be attributed to newly listed companies, which tend to be smaller, younger, more high-tech oriented, and, above all, to have lower earnings and higher earnings volatilities. Brown and Kapadia (2007) further examine the issue and find more evidence that newly listed companies contribute to increasing stock return volatilities. Schwert (2002) suggests that the unusually high return volatility during the late 1990s could be attributed to technology firms and hints that the increasing volatility is due to the increasing value of growth options associated with technology advances. The idea that links volatility to growth options also belongs to the fundamentals-based theories. While current earnings capture returns on assets in place, the present value of growth opportunities is an indispensable component of stock prices, especially for technology-oriented firms. It has become common in finance textbooks to state that stock prices are determined as the sum of the present value of earnings at the current level and growth opportunities. In a recent paper, Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008) use the market-to-book ratio of assets (MABA), the market-to-book ratio of equity, and their variations as proxies for growth options and find that the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility can be explained by these proxies. In addition, they report that an empirical model using a proxy for growth options outperforms models using earnings volatility.
The trading-based theories about volatility originate from various starting points. They share a common thread that their effects on stock return volatility are caused by trading volume. Volatility is widely believed to be related to trading volume. Schwert (2002) proposes to study the relation between the upward trend in stock return volatilities and trading volume, citing the ever-declining trading costs as one reason that trading volume has increased over time. Another reason for the increasing trading volume is the information at the firm level that has become more readily available due to improved regulations, better accounting standards, and more coverage by analysts. Early empirical studies on the relationship between volume and volatility are summarized by Karpoff (1987) . Karpoff's evidence, however, is mixed. More recent studies report a positive relationship between return volatilities and trading volumes. A notable example by Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) is the most relevant to the work presented in this paper.
The second half of the twentieth century saw a tremendous increase in institutional trading. Thanks to the propagation of the idea of diversification, more individuals now invest in stocks through mutual funds and pension funds. Institutional trading allegedly causes higher volatility because of the large trading sizes, which may cause stock prices to move more easily. Xu and Malkiel (2003) analyze the relationship between stock return volatility and institutional ownership and report a significantly positive association between the two. Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) report an increase over time in institutional holdings of smaller and riskier stocks that are known to be more volatile. This can potentially explain why the average stock return volatility has increased. It should be noted that institutional ownership is only used as a proxy for institutional trading because, obviously, ownership per se will not affect volatility. The result, however, is challenged in a recent paper by Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2010) . They confirm Xu and Malkiel's (2003) result for high-priced stocks. But they contend that highpriced stocks are not responsible for the increased average return volatility. Lowpriced stocks, which are responsible for the increased average return volatility, are mostly held and traded by retail investors. The relationship between return volatility and institutional holdings is negative for low-priced stocks. As such, whether or not institutional trading of stocks causes return volatility remains an unsettled question.
As in this paper, Brandt et al. (2010) question whether there is a sustained trend in idiosyncratic volatility. The difference between the two papers is that, while Brandt et al. (2010) document evidence of irrational trading behavior by retail investors during the late 1990s that allegedly caused a speculative bubble, this paper investigates the extent to which changes in the volatility trend can be explained by changes in the fundamentals. Another paper by Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2008) also questions whether there is a continued trend in idiosyncratic volatility in international markets. They focus on econometric modeling issues, however, rather than on the causes of the changing volatility.
III. Data
The U.S. data I use in this paper are from CRSP at the University of Chicago, Compustat, Datastream, and Thomson Financial. Daily return data for stocks listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and monthly data on trading volume are from CRSP. Quarterly accounting data are from Compustat. I use January 1976 as the starting point and December 2006 as the ending point of the sample period because before 1976 the number of firms with available earnings data and trading volume data is small. Thomson Financial's CDA/Spectrum database contains institutional holdings data (S34), which is the amount of a stock's outstanding shares held by all financial institutions that are required to file reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The institutional holdings data are available from March 1980. I also use international data from Datastream as a robustness check.
A. Average Volatility: The U.S.
While in most related studies, researchers have followed the lead of Campbell et al. (2001) in defining volatility as the variance of returns, the term volatility in this paper refers to the standard deviation of returns, which is more consistent with the current market practice. This change makes no material difference. Volatility as the conditional standard deviation is not directly observed. The early literature, such as that by Schwert (1989) , uses the absolute value of unexpected monthly returns according to certain models of expected returns as the realized monthly return volatility. More recent literature, however, has adopted the method of using the sum of the squared daily returns within a month as the realized monthly volatility.
The definition of idiosyncratic volatility depends on the specification of the systematic factors in the return-generating process. Let r itd be the return on stock i on trading day d in month t and let f td be the daily observations of the factors on day d in month t, and assume that the returns are generated by
where the coefficients a it and b it are constant within a month but may change across months. The idiosyncratic volatility for stock i in month t is defined as
where D t is the number of trading days in month t and ε itd is evaluated at the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of a it and b it . Two sets of factors are considered in this paper. The first set is the excess returns on the market portfolio, MKT. The second set consists of the three well-known factors, MKT, SMB, and HML, of Fama and French (1993) . The two sets of idiosyncratic volatilities corresponding to the two sets of factors are very similar, so only the one corresponding to the Fama-French factors is reported. I focus on value-weighted averages in this paper and denote them as IV t . The IV t calculated from all the stocks is labeled as IV and is plotted in Graph A of Figure 1 . The upward trend of the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility of all stocks, which is influenced mainly by large stocks, is not obvious until the late 1990s. The average volatilities declined sharply after 2000, with a brief surge in 2002. The level of valueweighted average idiosyncratic volatility at the end of 2006 is about the same as that in the 1970s. Besides a spike in October 1987, the most volatile period in the sample is the 5 years around 2000 when the stock prices were known to be very high.
In addition to examining the average idiosyncratic volatility of all stocks, I also analyze the average idiosyncratic volatility of stocks in various sectors. I divide stocks into sectors according to the exchange on which they are traded, their age (defined as the number of years they have been listed), and the industry they belong to. More specifically, stocks are classified into three exchanges: NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ; and two age groups: YOUNG firms that have been listed 7 or fewer years and MATURE firms that have been listed more than 7 years. 1 These six averages, ALL, NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, YOUNG, and MATURE, are classified as U.S. aggregates. I also study 10 industries: consumer nondurables (food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather, and toys), consumer durables (cars, TVs, furniture, and household appliances), manufacturing (machinery, trucks, planes, chemicals, office furniture, paper, and commercial printing), energy (oil, gas, and coal extraction and processing), high-tech business equipment (computers, software, and electronic equipment), telecom (telephone and television transmission), shops (wholesale, retail, etc.), health (health care, medical equipment, and drugs), utilities, and others (mines, construction, construction materials, transportation, Figure 1 plots the time series of the value-weighted average of idiosyncratic volatilities (IV) with respect to the three FamaFrench factors, the sample volatility of return on equity (VROE), the market-to-book ratio of assets (MABA), the logarithm of trading volume in dollars (VOLD), and the holdings in percentage by institutions (INST).
Graph A. IV, VROE, and MABA Graph B. VOLD and INST hotels, bus services, entertainment, and finance). These 10 averages are classified as U.S. industries.
B. Fundamentals Variables: The U.S.
I consider two fundamentals variables: the volatility of return on equity (VROE) and the MABA. The return on equity for stock i in month t is the stock's most recent quarterly earnings (annualized by a multiplier of 4), divided by the most recent book value of equity. Since financial statements are typically available with a 3-month delay, I assume a 3-month delay for determining when the earnings data are available. Most observations of the annualized return on equity fall in the interval of (−3, 3). However, some extreme values lie outside the interval. To avoid spurious inferences from these extreme values, they are winsorized at −3 and 3. The VROE used in this study, VROE it for stock i in month t, is the square root of the sample variance of the annualized quarterly return on equity over the last 12 quarters. The value-weighted average of VROE it s in month t is denoted as VROE t . Its time series is plotted in Figure 1 with the average idiosyncratic volatility. The value-weighted VROE t moves roughly with the trend of the value-weighted average total volatility. The time series of the average VROE t is much smoother than the volatility series, partially because it is calculated as a 12-quarter average.
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The market-to-book ratio of the assets of firm i in month t, denoted MABA it , is constructed as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt as the market value of assets at the end of month t divided by the most recent book value of assets at t using the 3-month delay assumption. The value-weighted average of MABA it is denoted as MABA t . MABA t is used as a proxy for growth options. Cao et al. (2008) also use the book-to-market ratio of equity, the ratio of capital expenditure to fixed assets, the ratio of debt to equity, and another proxy for the present value of growth options. Since they report that all these proxies give robust results, for brevity, these additional proxies are not analyzed in this paper. In Graph A of Figure 1 , the value-weighted average MABA moves very closely with the value-weighted average return volatility.
C. Trading Volume-Related Variables: The U.S.
Let VOLD it denote the trading volume for stock i in month t measured in thousands of dollars. Denote VOLD t as the logarithm of the value-weighted average VOLD it . The plot in Graph B of Figure 1 shows that it increased over time with the average idiosyncratic volatility before 2000. However, while the average idiosyncratic volatility reduces after 2000, the value-weighted trading volume stays high. This observation casts doubt on the robustness of trading volume in explaining volatility trends.
Let INST it be the fraction of stock i held in month t by the so-called 13F financial institutions (mutual funds, pension funds, banks, insurance companies, university endowments, and numerous other professional investment advisers) that are required to file Form 13F with the SEC. Denote INST t as the valueweighted average of INST it . Graph B of Figure 1 plots its time series. The valueweighted average institutional holding increases from about 40% to above 60% during March 1980 -December 2006 (1980 .03-2006 . The speed of the increase is fairly steady.
D. International Markets
Datastream includes data on both returns and accounting information of international markets. Due to data constraints, I examine the average return volatilities in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore during the period 1990.02-2006.12. Figure 2 plots the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatilities with respect to the market portfolios of the respective countries. The plots reveal that there is a pattern similar to that in the U.S. in all these countries to various degrees. The volatilities increase slowly before 2000 and decrease roughly after 2000. The turning point varies, however. The only exception is Japan, which had a stock market bubble and burst around 1990, and the return volatility is unusually high at that time.
FIGURE 2
Value-Weighted Average Volatilities in International Markets Figure 2 plots the time series of the value-weighted average idiosyncratic return volatility in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Graph A. Australia, Canada, and France Graph B. Germany, Italy, and the UK Graph C. Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore
The accounting data available from Datastream are on an annual basis. Therefore, VROE cannot be meaningfully constructed. I opt for using return on equity itself, denoted as ROE. Trading volume data are not available until 1990 for many countries. Data on institutional holdings are not available either. The analysis below is conducted under these constraints. To conserve space, I skip the plots for the fundamentals variables and the volume variables.
IV. Volatility Trends
To investigate the volatility trends, I begin with the following regressions: , measure the monthly increment of the idiosyncratic volatility during the two subperiods, respectively. The hypothesis that the average volatility is described by a simple linear trend for the entire sample period can be tested through the linear hypothesis (a 1 , b t1 ) = (a 2 , b t2 ), which is represented by regression model (4). Table 1 reports the estimated slope coefficients using the U.S. aggregate data. LR(OLS) is the likelihood ratio test of the linear hypothesis, known as the Chow test for testing the existence of a structural break, under the assumption that the error term is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and the distribution is normal. LR(GMM) is the likelihood ratio test of the linear hypothesis with the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation under the assumption that the error term is autocorrelated with heteroskedasticity, as proposed by Newey and West (1987a) . The numbers in the parentheses under the coefficient estimates are Newey and West (1987b) t-ratios adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with a lag of 24 months. It should be noted that regression models (3)-(4) are not meant to be good descriptive models for average idiosyncratic volatilities. They play the role of a simple structure to test the null hypothesis that there is a common trend in the volatilities in the entire sample period. Except for the aggregate volatility of the stocks traded on AMEX, all the volatility series have a significantly positive trend in the 1976-2000 subperiod and a significantly negative trend in the 2001-2006 subperiod. None of them have a significant trend over the entire sample period, however, as evidenced by the insignificant estimates, b t s. For the six aggregate volatility series, the hypothesis that they have the same structure during the two subperiods is strongly rejected by the very low p-values of the likelihood ratio tests. During the two subperiods, it is the NASDAQ stocks and YOUNG firm stocks that have the largest rises and falls in their idiosyncratic volatility. Table 2 reports the same trend analysis for the 10 industries. Among the 10 industries, consumer durables, manufacturing companies, high-tech companies, telecom companies, shops, and health companies exhibit significant increases in the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility, while others do not exhibit very significant increases in 1976-2000. Except for the energy industry, all the industries have significant declines in their idiosyncratic volatility. Over the entire sample period, all the industries have insignificant trend slopes except for the consumer durables industry. The hypothesis that they have the same structure during the two subperiods is also strongly rejected by the very low p-values of the likelihood ratio tests.
TABLE 2
Trends of Average Volatilities: U.S. Industries 02-2006.12 , no country has a significantly positive trend in idiosyncratic volatility. The hypothesis of equal coefficients of the regression model for the two subperiods is strongly rejected for all the countries.
The results presented in this section clearly indicate that there are rises and falls in the idiosyncratic volatility in all the sectors/industries of the U.S. market and various international markets. Overall, there is no sustained upward linear trend in the U.S. sectors, industries, or international markets.
V. Fundamentals-versus Trading Volume-Based Explanations
In this section, I present time-series regression results that compare the performance of the fundamentals-based theories with the trading volume-based theories in explaining the pattern of the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns. Strictly speaking, since volatility is positive, a positive function is required to describe its relationship with other variables. It turns out that the qualitative results are the same whether volatility or log volatility is used as the dependent variable. I report the results of the former because they can be compared more easily with the results in the literature.
A. U.S. Aggregates
I begin with a reexamination of each of the explanatory variables individually. I estimate the slope coefficients in the univariate regressions of IV t on VROE t−1 , MABA t−1 , VOLD t−1 , and INST t−1 . The univariate regression takes the form In addition, I run regressions in which the coefficients in the two subperiods are constrained to be the same,
and I run a regression of the estimated residual on the time trends,
Like those in the trend analysis, LR(OLS) and LR(GMM) are the likelihood ratio tests of the hypothesis (a x1 , b x1 ) = (a x2 , b x2 ). As a legitimate explanatory variable, the sign of the coefficients, b x1 and b x2 , will not change across the two subperiods even when the trend in the idiosyncratic return volatility reverses. If the relationship between the idiosyncratic volatility and the explanatory variable is stable, the magnitudes of the coefficients for the two subperiods will not be too different either. In addition, if the variable is adequate in explaining the return volatility by itself, the residual, η t , will not contain trend components.
The estimated slope coefficients for the U.S. aggregates are reported in Table 4 . The results in Panel A show that the slope coefficients of VROE are significantly positive in both subperiods for U.S. aggregate averages except AMEX. The hypothesis of no structural break is rejected, however. The estimated slope coefficient for the entire period under the constraint of no structural break is less significant than is the estimated slope coefficient for the first subperiod in most cases. More importantly, the residual from the regression under the constraint of no structural break still has a positive trend in the first subperiod and a negative trend in the second subperiod in all cases, although it is not always significant.
The results in Panel B of Table 4 indicate that the slope coefficients of MABA are significantly positive in both subperiods for all U.S. aggregate averages except AMEX, for which the slope coefficient in the second subperiod is significantly negative. The hypothesis of no structural break is rejected at the 0.01 level for all the cases except NYSE after adjustments for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The estimated slope coefficient under the constraint of no structural break is significantly positive for all cases, including NYSE, whose value is very small. The residuals under the constraint of no structural break contain a significantly positive trend in the first subperiod for ALL, NASDAQ, and YOUNG firm stocks.
Panel C of Table 4 reports the estimated slope coefficients of VOLD. They are all significantly positive for the first subperiod, but mixed for the second subperiod. The slope coefficient for the entire sample is insignificant except for NAS-DAQ, which is positive and marginally significant. Under the constraint of no structural break, the residuals of all aggregates contain a significantly positive trend in the first subperiod and a negative, though not significant, trend in the second subperiod.
for the second subperiod, and insignificant for the entire sample period under the constraint of no structural break. The hypothesis of no structural break is strongly rejected, and the residuals estimated from the constraint of no structural break exhibit a significant, positive trend in the first subperiod and a not-so-significant, negative trend in the second subperiod.
The results of univariate regressions clearly indicate that the fundamentals variables do a much better job than the trading volume variables in explaining the variation in the return volatilities. Between the two fundamentals variables,
TABLE 4
Univariate Regressions: U.S. Aggregates Table 4 presents estimates of slope coefficients in univariate regressions of value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatilities on various explanatory variables,
where IV is the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility; x is the value-weighted average volatility of return on equity (VROE), market-to-book assets (MABA), the logarithm of trading volume in dollars (VOLD) 
LR(OLS) is the likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis (ax1, bx1)=(ax2, bx2) under the assumption that the error term is i.i.d. and normally distributed, following the F(T − 4, 2) distribution where T is the number of observations for the entire sample period. LR(GMM) is the likelihood ratio test of the constraint under the assumption that the error term is autocorrelated with conditional heteroskedasticity, following the χ 2 2 distribution asymptotically. The reported estimates of b1t and b2t are multiplied by 100. The numbers in parentheses below the b estimates are t-statistics adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West (1987b) MABA appears to have stronger explanatory power than VROE in terms of the t-ratio when both are used alone. Figure 3 presents scatter plots of IV in relation to VROE and IV in relation to MABA for the average of ALL stocks and reveals certain differences between the two fundamentals variables. The relationship between IV and VROE does not appear to be very tight, indicating that VROE alone leaves much variation in IV unexplained. The relationship also appears slightly nonlinear. On the other hand, the relationship between IV and MABA is mainly driven by a small number of influential points, defined as observations whose MABA value is more than three standard deviations away from the mean. In a robust regression (not reported here) that removes these influential points, mostly the observations around year 2000, the explanatory power of MABA is much reduced. For example, the t-ratio of b MABA for ALL stocks in Panel B of Table 4 drops from 18.55 to 2.91 if observations that are three standard deviations away from the mean of the remaining sample are removed. In fact, about half of the slope estimates of MABA in Tables 4-6 become insignificant with their t-ratios less than 2 when influential points are removed. On the other hand, the coefficients of VROE are robust. I now examine the explanatory power of various variables in multiple regressions. Instead of reporting results on all the variables and various combinations, I report in Table 5 the results of the regression of IV on VROE and MABA and Graph A. IV in Relation to VROE Graph B. IV in Relation to MABA of the regression of its residual on VOLD and INST separately. The results show that MABA is the most useful explanatory variable for all the U.S. aggregate average volatilities. For ALL, NYSE, and MATURE stocks, VROE is edged out by MABA, while for NASDAQ, YOUNG, and, to a lesser extent, AMEX, VROE remains useful in explaining the variation in return volatility. Cao et al. (2008) report that MABA outperforms VROE in explaining the value-weighted average of ALL stocks volatilities. Conditioned on VROE and MABA, VOLD does not have additional explanatory power. While INST has a significant slope coefficient in most cases, the sign of the estimated coefficient is wrong, contrary to the explanation given by its proponents.
From the previous analysis, it is clear that, although fundamentals variables have better explanatory power across the two subperiods, the hypothesis of no structural break is strongly rejected. To investigate the change in their absolute and relative explanatory power over time, I calculate the following quantities: At the end of each month from 1985.12 to 2006.12, I regress IV on VROE using the data of the past 10 years. The R 2 is denoted as R Figure 4 The plot shows that in the early part of the sample period while the idiosyncratic volatility is low, the proportion that can be explained is also low, less than 20%. As VROE and MABA are highly correlated in the early part, the additional explanatory power of either VROE or MABA, conditioned on the other variable, is near 0. It is not until the late 1990s, when the idiosyncratic volatility shoots up, that the proportion explained by the two fundamentals variables starts to increase. These proportions peak for the 10 years ending around 2001. The additional contribution from VROE remains near 0, while the additional contribution from MABA becomes higher. As the return volatility declines after 2000, so do the R 2 s. By the end of 2006, the explanatory power of VROE declines to around 25%, while that of MABA remains above 60%. The partial R 2 of VROE conditioned on MABA, R 2 VROE|MABA , remains low all the time. The partial R 2 of MABA conditioned on VROE fluctuates in relation to R 2 VROE after 2000. The plots of the R 2 s for NYSE, AMEX, and MATURE stocks are very much the same as those for ALL stocks. The plots for NASDAQ are also similar to a lesser degree. They are not presented here. The plots for YOUNG stocks, however, appear to be quite different and are plotted in Graph B of Figure 4 . The difference is that the proportion of the idiosyncratic volatility explained by fundamentals variables is relatively much higher in the early part of the sample period. Another important difference is that, toward the end of the sample 
B. U.S. Industries and International Markets
In this subsection, I examine the U.S. industries and international markets. The purpose is to check how robust the major findings on the U.S. aggregate averages are. I focus on the comparison between the fundamentals-based variables and trading volume-based variables. Table 6 reports univariate and multiple regressions of the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility on value-weighted average ROE, MABA, VOLD, and INST over the entire sample period. For certain industries, such as nondurables, energy, and utilities, none of the variables is useful. These industries tend to be the ones that do not have large fluctuations in idiosyncratic volatility, as seen from Table 2 . Other than these industries, either VROE or MABA is useful. For some industries, both are useful when used alone. VOLD is useful for durables, high-tech, telecom, and health industries when used alone. INST is not useful at all. For those industries that do have large variations in idiosyncratic volatility, MABA is the most useful in multiple regressions, and VROE remains useful for durables and high-tech industries. The residuals from multiple regressions of IV on VROE and MABA cannot be further explained by VOLD. While INST is significant for the residuals, the sign is wrong. These patterns are very similar to those found for the U.S. aggregate averages.
TABLE 6
Univariate and Multiple Regressions: U.S. Industries Table 6 presents estimated slope coefficients of univariate and multiple regressions of IV t on VROE t−1 , MABA t−1 , VOLD t−1 , and INST t−1 , for various industries. From the multiple regressions
the residual,ηt , is regressed on VOLD t−1 and INST t−1 separately,
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West (1987b) Table 7 reports the slope coefficients of the univariate and multiple regressions of the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility in international markets on their ROE, MABA, and VOLD. As VROE is not available, ROE is used to capture the uncertainty in the current earnings. Except for Singapore, ROE is not useful in explaining the value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatility, as in the U.S. data. The coefficients of MABA for value-weighted average idiosyncratic volatilities are significant for most countries in the univariate regressions. The volume variable is useful to explain volatility in Canada, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The results of the multiple regressions of the volatility on ROE and MABA are similar to those of the univariate regressions. Volume is useful conditioned on ROE and MABA only for Singapore. Overall, while the usefulness of these variables is mixed for different countries, the patterns that can be identified are similar to those found in the U.S. 
VI. Conclusions
Recent changes in volatility trends provide an opportunity to test various theories on what causes stock return volatilities to vary. I first present evidence that there is no common linear trend in the entire sample period of 1976-2006, based on the aggregate index of all U.S. stocks, stocks in various sectors and industries in the U.S., and stocks in international markets. I examine two broad sets of theories on the causes of time-varying stock return volatilities, the fundamentalsbased theories and the trading volume-based theories. Both types of theories can explain the upward trend in the return volatilities for U.S. stocks from 1976 to the late 1990s. However, the fundamentals-based theories remain valid, while the trading volume-based theories cannot explain trends in the 2001-2006 period. To a lesser degree, some international markets exhibit the same pattern. The explanatory power of the two fundamentals variables varies over time. The marketto-book ratio of assets as a proxy for growth options is found to be capable of explaining the volatility patterns better than the current earnings volatility does for large and mature firms, especially in the second half of the sample period from 1976 to 2006. However, the relationship between the return volatility and the market-to-book ratio is not very robust. The volatility of current earnings, on the other hand, remains useful in explaining the return volatility for smaller and younger firms. The relationship between the return volatility and the earnings volatility is robust.
While the results of this paper are based on data in the sample period 1976-2006, it is likely that the subsequent increase in the stock return volatilities in 2007 and the turmoil in the autumn of 2008 provide further evidence to support the fundamentals-based theories, especially the theory based on earnings volatility. The rise of return volatilities in 2007 was largely caused by increasing energy costs, which ate into corporate earnings and created uncertainty about future earnings. The surge in return volatilities in 2008, on the other hand, was triggered by problems with the fundamentals of the financial services industry, which had been badly damaged by the credit squeeze from the failure of subprime loans in the property market.
The results in this paper have implications for many asset pricing and corporate finance issues. First, the concern for investors who cannot fully diversify their investments that investment performance would continually deteriorate, triggered by the Campbell et al. (2001) finding, is unwarranted. According to the fundamentals-based theory, investment risk can be reduced for such investors by avoiding stocks that have high volatilities in their fundamentals. Second, for large investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds, diversification gains exist mostly in stocks that have high earnings volatilities and high market-to-book ratios, which, to some extent, are predictable and therefore can be taken into consideration in forming dynamically optimal portfolios. Third, the empirical facts documented in this paper should help to resolve the theoretical and empirical issues on the cross-sectional relationship between expected returns and idiosyncratic volatilities. The results in this paper are also useful to corporate managers and investors who need to calculate the cost of equity in various applications that require decomposing the total return risk into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. This is particularly relevant to determining the cost of capital of initial public offerings, for which historical return data are not available, while past earnings data can be used to determine the cost of equity, as well as expected future earnings.
